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Abstract
This Article discusses the Community directive on insider dealing strictly from the point of
view of Community law, and more specifically of what may be called the Community’s constitutional law - the powers of the institutions involved in the making and in the implementation of law
- rather than from the point of view of insider trading as an economic phenomenon and the ways
it is perceived and dealt with in Community law.

THE DIRECTIVE ON INSIDER DEALING
Raffaello Fornasier*
INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been a remarkable amount of
legislative activity in Europe to combat insider dealing (or insider trading) at the national as well as at the European Community (the "EC" or the "Community") levels.' This trend reflects a sharp increase in stock market transactions, corresponding to a widespread movement towards concentrations
on the one hand and to closer links among stock exchanges on
the other throughout the Western world.2
From the Community's point of view in particular, the
goal of a large integrated market by the end of 1992, pursuant
to the Single European Act, 3 has brought about two developments. First, restructuring of undertakings has occurred at
both the national and Community levels, in order to give optimum size to undertakings for the production of goods and the
provision of services in view of the 'new challenge of competition. Second, there has also been an international restructuring of undertakings across the Community's external borders,
in order to satisfy the desire of non-EC companies to get a
foothold in the single market after 1992.
It is in this context of intense activity aimed at mergers
and acquisitions that insider dealing has revealed itself as a
problem and as a threat to the correct and smooth functioning
of stock exchanges in the Community. A few instances involving convictions or suspicions of insider trading have given rise
* The author is Director General of the Legal Service of the Council of the Eu-

ropean Communities, and Professor a.c., University of Padova. The views expressed
in this Article are solely those of the author.
1. See INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION § 6.13, at
6-45 (United Kingdom), § 7.16, at 7-37 (France), § 8.11, at 8-27 (the Netherlands),
§ 8A.13, at 8A-47 (Belgium) (H. Bloomenthal ed. 1987).
2. See Internationalization of the Securities Market, Exchange Act Release No.
21,958, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,759, at 87,385
(Apr. 18, 1985).
1
3. Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
21,000 [hereinafter Single European Act], amending Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I), 298
U.N.T.S. II [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
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to scandals that have attained political relevance 4 and so have
contributed to the necessity of speedily solving the problem.
This Article will discuss the Community directive on insider dealing (the "Directive on Insider Dealing" or the "Directive") strictly from the point of view of Community law, and
more specifically of what may be called the Community's constitutional law-the powers of the institutions involved in the
making and in the implementation of law-rather than from
the point of view of insider trading as an economic phenomenon and the ways it is perceived and dealt with in Community
law. 5
I. THE INSIDER TRADING DIRECTIVE AND THE
COOPERATION PROCEDURE
On July 18, 1989, the Council of Ministers of the European Communities (the "Council") adopted a common position with a view to the adoption of a directive on insider dealing (the "Amended Proposal"). 6 In accordance with the cooperation procedure established by the Single European Act,
4. Kamm, Five Indicted in Francifor Tradingof Triangle Shares During Takeover, Wall
St.J., Feb. 17, 1989, at A 1l, col. 2; Forman, Old World Traditions Include Insider Trading,
Wall St.J., Feb. 8, 1989, at Cl, col. 3; Lohr, Guinness Scandal Roils Britain, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 30, 1987, at Dl, col. 3; Lohr, Ouster at London Stock Firm, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12,
1986, at D5, col. 1.
5. The Directive on Insider Dealing began as Proposal for a Council Directive
Coordinating Regulations on Insider Trading, COM(87) 111 final, O.J. C 153/8
(1987) [hereinafter First Proposal]. Subsequently, the European Parliament issued
an opinion on the proposal. Opinion of European Parliament on Proposal from the
Commission to the Council for a Directive Coordinating Regulations on Insider
Trading, Oj. C 187/93 (1988). Pursuant to the opinion of the Parliament, the original proposal was then amended by the Council as Amendment to the Proposal for a
Council Directive Coordinating Regulations on Insider Trading, COM(88) 549 final,
OJ. C 277/13 (1988). The amended proposal was adopted by the Council on July
18, 1989. Common Position Adopted by the Council on July 18, 1989 with a View to
the Adoption of a Directive Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing, Eur. Par.
Sess. Docs., ser. C, Doc. C 3-0018/89 (July 28, 1989) [hereinafter Amended Proposal]. The Amended Proposal consists of four parts: the Council Letter, the Common
Position of the Council (the "Common Position"), the Council's Reasons (the
"Council Reasons"), and the Commission Communication (the "Commission Communication"). Id. The Amended Proposal was approved by the Parliament on October 11, 1989 in accordance with the cooperation procedure. The Amended Proposal
was subsequently adopted by the Council without discussion. Council Directive of 13
November 1989 Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing, O.J. L 334/30 (1989),
reprinted infra pp. 178-84 [hereinafter Directive on Insider Dealing].
6. Amended Proposal, supra note 5.
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which, among other things, introduced this procedure for the
adoption of certain Community acts, the Council sent the
Amended Proposal to the European Parliament (the "Parliament") duly accompanied by a statement of the Council's reasons.7 The Parliament may approve the Amended Proposal
either explicitly or tacitly by letting time elapse, propose
7. The cooperation procedure was established by the Single European Act. Single European Act, supra note 3, art. 7, OJ. L 169/5, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
21,000, 21,060. Article 7 states:
Where, in pursuance of this Treaty, the Council acts in cooperation with the
European Parliament, the following procedure shall apply:
(a) The Council, acting by a qualified majority under the conditions of
paragraph 1, on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the
Opinion of the European Parliament, shall adopt a common position.
(b) The Council's common position shall be communicated to the European Parliament. The Council and the Commission shall inform the European Parliament fully of the reasons which led the Council to adopt its
common position and also of the Commission's position.
If, within three months of such communication, the European Parliament approves this common position or has not taken a decision within that
period, the Council shall definitively adopt the act in question in accordance
with the common position.
(c) The European Parliament may within the period of three months
referred to in point (b) by an absolute majority of its component members
propose amendments to the Council's common position. The European
Parliament may also, by the same majority, reject the Council's common
position. The result of the proceedings shall be transmitted to the Council
and the Commission.
If the European Parliament has rejected the Council's common position, unanimity shall be required for the Council to act on a second reading.
(d) The Commission shall, within a period of one month, re-examine
the proposal on the basis of which the Council .adopted its common position, by taking into account the amendments proposed by the European Parliament.
The Commission shall forward to the Council, at the same time as its
re-examined proposal, the amendments of the European Parliament which it
has not accepted, and shall express its opinion on them. The Council may
adopt these amendments unanimously.
(e) The Council acting by a qualified majority, shall adopt the Proposal
as re-examined by the Commission.
Unanimity shall be required for the Council to amend the proposal as
re-examined by the Commission.
(f) In the cases referred to in points (c), (d) and (e), the Council shall
be required to act within a period of three months. If no decision is taken
within this period, the Commission proposal shall be deemed not to have
been adopted.
(g) The periods referred to in points (b) and () may be extended by a
maximum of one month by common accord between the Council and the
European Parliament.
Id. (amending EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 149(2)).
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amendments to it, or reject it out of hand. 8 Bearing in mind
the opinion delivered by the Parliament in the previous phase
of the procedure, 9 it was reasonable to assume that the
Amended Proposal would be approved and that the Council
would consequently adopt the draft.
Because the Amended Proposal was adopted unanimously
by the Council (as explicitly and somewhat teasingly stated in
the Council reasons),' 0 eventual adoption by the Council was
to be expected in any event. According to the cooperation
procedure, the Council can adopt a directive unanimously
even if it is rejected by Parliament or modified in a new proposal by the Commission of the European Communities (the
"Commission") following amendments put forward by the Parliament. '
The initial proposal for the Directive on Insider Dealing
was submitted by the Commission to the Council on May 25,
1987. 12 The Council adopted the Directive on November 13,
1989.1" Only twenty-nine months elapsed between the date of
the first proposal and the adoption of that Directive, a particularly short period by any standard of Community law-making
records.
A very simple pattern governs the provisions of the Directive on Insider Dealing. First, the Directive defines both "inside information" and "insider."' 4 Second, the Directive sets
out two specific obligations for Member States: (1) to prohibit
the use of insider information by insiders,' 5 and (2) to sanction
properly violations of this prohibition.' 6 Third, the Directive
establishes a system of cooperation among competent national
authorities in exchanging information on insider trading. 17 Finally, there is a provision allowing for future international
8. See id.

9. See Legislative Resolution, OJ. C 187/93 (1988).
10. See Amended Proposal, supra note 5, Eur. Par. Sess. Docs. ser. C, Doc. C30018/89, Council Reasons, at 2.
11. See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 149(2)(c), added by Single European Act,
supra note 3, art. 7, O.J. L 169/5, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 21,000, 21,060.
12. Proposal for a Council Directive, O.J. C 153/8 (1987).
13. Directive on Insider Dealing, supra note 5, reprinted infra pp. 178-84.
14. Id. art. 1, at 31, reprinted infra p. 180.

15. Id. arts. 2-4, at 31, reprinted infra pp. 180-81.
16. Id. art. 13, at 32, reprinted infra p. 184.

17. Id. arts. 8-10, at 32, reprinted infra pp. 182-83.
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agreements on insider trading to be entered into by the Communify. s
The Council's reasons for adopting the text are most synthetically expressed in the Council's Statement to the Parliament, contained in the Amended Proposal, in the following
way:
1. Transferable securities markets play a central role in a
modern market economy, ensuring that economic operators
have the necessary sources of finance placed at their disposal. It is therefore essential that such markets operate
smoothly. Consequently, it is necessary to guarantee both the
greatest possible balance between demand and supply and equality of
opportunityfor all investors.

2. The aim of the Directive is therefore to prohibit insider
dealing enabling individuals in possession of inside information to take advantage of it at the expense of other investors, thus undermining confidence in equality of opportunity and affecting the smooth running of the transferable
securities market.
3. The attempt to arrive at Community rules on the subject arose from the observation that in several Member
States there are no provisions prohibiting insider dealing
and that, where rules do exist in Member States, there are
considerable differences between them. 19
If one considers that insider trading can hardly be said to
affect the balance between demand and supply of means of financing, one is left with the only other stated objective of the
Directive, which is to guarantee equality of opportunity for all
investors. 2" This observation is important in determining the
correct legal basis of the Directive on Insider Dealing. The
aim of ensuring equal opportunities for investors is already
clearly stated in the preamble to the Directive, where it is nevertheless somewhat overshadowed among other considerations. 21
After considering the legal basis of the Directive on Insider Dealing, this Article will examine some questions con18. Id. art. 11, at 32, reprinted infra pp. 183-84.
19. Amended Proposal, supra note 5, Eur. Par. Sess. Docs. ser. C, Doc. C3-0018/

89, Council Reasons, at 2-3 (emphasis added).
20. See id.
21. See Directive on Insider Dealing, supra note 5, preamble, O.J. L 334/30, reprinted infra pp. 178-79.
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cerning the implementation of the Directive by the Community's Member States and mutual assistance in the exchange of
information among Member States. This Article will also consider where competence lies in the application of the Directive
to non-Member States.
II. THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE DIRECTIVE
The proposal for a directive on insider dealing was originally put forward by the Commission on the basis of Article
5 4(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty (the "Treaty").2 2
The Commission
presented the proposed insider dealing directive as constituting an essential supplement to the directives already adopted
or being considered by the Council in the securities field.
The Council has adopted three directives that affect the
securities market and is considering a fourth. The earliest directive adopted regulates coordination of the conditions for
the admission of securities to an official stock exchange listing
(the "Directive on Admission to Securities Listing").2" The
second directive adopted coordinates the requirements for the
drafting, scrutiny, and distribution of the listing particulars to
be published for the admission of securities to an official stock
exchange listing (the "Directive on Prospectuses").2 4 The
third directive already adopted concerns information to be
published on a regular basis by companies whose shares have
been admitted to an official stock exchange listing (the "Direc22. See First Proposal, supra note 5, at 8. Article 54(3)(g) provides:
The Council and the Commission shall carry out the duties devolving upon
them under the preceeding provisions, in particular: by coordinating to the
necessary extent the safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of
members and others, are required by Member States of companies or firms
within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 [of the EEC
Treaty] with a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the
Community.
EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 54(3)(g), 1973 Gr. Brit. T. S. No. 1,at 23-24, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, 38-39. " 'Companies or firms' means companies or firms constituted
under civil or commercial law, including cooperative societies, and other legal persons governed by public or private law, save for those which are non-profit-making."
Id. art. 58, 1973 Gr.Brit T.S. No. 1, at 25, 298 U.N.T.S. at 40.
23. Council Directive No. 79/279, Oj. L 66/21 (1979), Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 1721 [hereinafter Directive on Admission to Securities Listing].
24. Council Directive No. 80/390, O.J. L 100/1 (1980), Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 1731 [hereinafter Directive on Prospectuses].
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tive on Regularly Published Information").2 5 The directive
that has been proposed, but not yet adopted, is intended to set
requirements as to what information is to be published when
major holdings in the capital of a listed company are disposed
of or acquired (the "Proposal for a Directive on Holdings").2 6
The Commission has stated that, like these four directives,
the Directive on Insider Dealing also aims at providing effective protection for investors on the securities markets, ensuring the proper operation of securities markets throughout the
Community, and promoting greater interpenetration of national securities markets at the Community level.2 7
The directives that have already been adopted are based
on both Article 54 and Article 100 of the EEC Treaty. 28 However, the Proposal for a Directive on Holdings and the original
proposal for an insider trading directive were based on Article
54 alone. 29 The Directive on Insider Dealing, however, is
based on Article 100a.3 °
It may be of interest here to discuss briefly the appropri25. Council Directive No. 82/121, OJ. L 48/26 (1982), Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 1741 [hereinafter Directive on Regularly Published Information].
26. Proposal for Council Directive No. 351/12, O.J. C 351/35 (1985) [hereinafter Proposal for Directive on Holdings].
27. See Amended Proposal, supra note 5, Eur. Par. Sess. Docs., ser. C, Doc. C30018/89, Commission Communication, at 2.
28. See Directive on Regularly Published Information, supra note 25, preamble,
O.J. L 48/26, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
1741; Directive on Prospectuses, supra
note 24, preamble, O.J. L 100/1, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1731; Directive on
Admission to Securities Listings, supra note 26, preamble, OJ. L 66/21, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1721. Article 100 states that "[t]he Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, issue directives for the approximation of
such provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member
States as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common market."
EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 100, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 37, 298 U.N.T.S. at
54.
29. See First Proposal, supra note 5, preamble, O.J. C 153/8; Proposal for Directive on Holdings, supra note 26, preamble, OJ. C 351/35.
30. Directive on Insider Dealing, supra note 5, preamble, OJ. L 334/30. Article
100a states:
By way of derogation from Article 100 and save where otherwise provided in
this Treaty, the following provisions shall apply for the achievement of the
objectives set out in Article 8a. The Council shall, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission in cooperation with the European
Parliament and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, adopt
the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their object
the establishment and functioning of the internal market.
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ateness of these different legal bases. First, as one commentator has pointed out, the Community system is based on powers
of distribution, and consequently, to the extent that a power is
conferred upon the Community, it is subtracted from the
Member States . 3 t Second, because the legal basis of an act determines the procedure applicable for its adoption, an incorrect legal basis entailing a wrong procedure may affect the legality of the act.3 2 Finally, according to the case law of the
Court of Justice of the European Communities (the "Court"),
the legal basis of an act must be determined objectively in the
light of its purpose so that the choice of legal basis, unless
challenged, necessarily has a bearing on the interpretation to
be given to the act.
A discussion of the legal bases of the directives already
enacted may also shed some light on the question of the appropriate legal basis of the Proposal for a Directive on Holdings, as well as of all future directives concerning the securities
market. Such a discussion may even have a bearing on the international competence of the Community in this field. Before
addressing these issues, it is worth pointing out that the Single
European Act not only introduced the new Article 100a, but
also modified Article 54 on the point of applicable procedure. 3 Under both Article 54 and Article 100a, the cooperation procedure now applies.
The Council's rationale for adopting the three securities
related directives currently in force based on Article 54 and
Article 100 of the Treaty is worthy of consideration. The preambles of these acts, which give the reasons for their adoption
and consequently the justification of the legal basis chosen by
EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 100a, added by Single European Act, supra note 3, art.
18, O.J. L 169/8, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 21,000, 21,170.
3 1. See Haagsma, The European Community's Environmental Policy: A Case-Study in
Federalism, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 311, 314 (1989).
32. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
33. EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 54(2), added by Single European Act, supra note
3, art. 6, O.J. L 169/5, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 21,000, 21,050. Article 6 provides:
In Article 54(2) of the EEC Treaty the terms "the Council shall, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Economic and Social
Committee and the Assembly", shall be replaced by "the Council shall, acting on a proposal from the Commission, in cooperation with the European
Parliament and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee".
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the drafters, indicate that the acts are mainly intended to coordinate national rules on guarantees offered by companies to
their members and creditors.3 4 It is only in a subsidiary way
that the preambles assess that such coordination will contribute to the correct and smooth functioning of a capital market
in the Community.35 This purpose would not justify a double
legal basis, because, according to the Court, it is the main objective pursued that determines the correct legal bases of an
act.3 6
Therefore, it cannot be because the purpose of creating a
common market for capital is incidentally pursued that the
three directives already enacted also invoke Article 100. On
the contrary, the very reason for invoking Article 100 is explicitly. stated in the Directive on Admission to Securities Listing.
This Directive states:
Whereas such coordination must therefore apply to securities, independently of the legal status of their issuers, and
must therefore also apply to securities issued by non-mem34. Directive on Regularly Published Information, supra note 23, preamble, O.J.
L 48/26 (coordination of requirements for regular information to be published by

companies will improve protection of investors and make protection more
equivalent); Directive on Prospectuses, supra note 24, preamble, O.J. L 100/1 (differences in safeguards required by Member States in area of listing of particulars for
admission of securities to stock exchanges should be eliminated by coordinating the
rules and regulations without necessarily making them completely uniform); Directive on Admission to Securities Listing, supra note 25, preamble, O.J. L 66/21 (coordination of conditions for admission of securities to official listing on stock exchanges
will provide equivalent protection for investors at Community level, by establishing
uniform guarantees offered to investors in Member States).
35. Directive on Regularly Published Information, supra note 23, preamble, O.J.
L 48/26 (coordination of requirements for publication of regular information by
companies admitted to official stock exchange listing will, in so doing, contribute
towards establishment of genuine Community capital market by permitting fuller interpenetration of securities markets); Directive on Prospectuses, supra note 24, preamble, OJ. L 100/1 (coordination of rules and regulations for listing of particulars
for admission of securities to stock exchanges will, at same time, take into account
liberalization of Community capital movements and fact that mechanism for checking
at time securities are offered does not yet exist); Directive on Admission to Securities
Listing, supra note 25, preamble, O.J. L 66/21 (coordination of requirements for admission to stock exchanges will accordingly make for greater interpenetration of na-

tional securities markets).
36. See United Kingdom v. Council, Case 68/86, 1988 E.C.R. _, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,475 (measure is not void for failure to meet duty to state reasons for
measure where legal basis stated is correct); Commission v. Council, Case 45/86,
1987 E.C.R. 1493, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,421 (regulation on generalized
tariff preferences declared void due to incorrect legal basis).
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ber States or their regional or local authorities or international public bodies; whereas this Directive therefore covers
entities not covered by the second paragraph of Article 58
of the Treaty and goes beyond the scope of Article 54(3)(g)
while directly affecting the establishment and functioning 7of
the common market within the meaning of Article 100.1
It seems here that the Community's legislators believed that,
because the main purpose of the Directive cannot be pursued
on the basis of Article 54, with regard to entities other than
those contemplated in Article 58,38 Article 100 should be invoked to cover the latter.
As for the Directive on Prospectuses, the same explanation seems to result from the following wording:
Whereas such coordination must apply to securities independently of the legal status of the issuing undertaking, and
accordingly, in so far as this Directive applies to entities to
which no reference is made in the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty and goes beyond the scope of Article
54(3)(g), it must be based also on Article 100." 9
Similar wording may be found in the last recitals of the
Directive on Regularly Published Information, where, nevertheless, non-EC companies, not regulatory authorities, are referred to:
Whereas, so as to ensure the effective protection of investors and the proper operation of stock exchanges, the rules
relating to regular information to be published by companies, the shares of which are admitted to [an] official stock
exchange listing within the Community, should apply not
only to companies from Member States, but also to companies from non-member countries.4 °
At this point in the analysis, one wonders whether the reasoning behind the choice of legal basis for the directives already enacted is not contradictory, and ultimately wrong. In
effect, Article 54 is to be found in that part of the EEC Treaty
37. Directive on Admission to Securities Listing, supra note 25, preamble, O.J. L
66/21.
38. EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 58, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 25, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, 40. See supra note 22 for the text of Article 54(3)(g).
39. Directive on Prospectuses, supra note 24, preamble, Oj. L 100/1, at 2.
40. Directive on Regularly Published Information, supra note 23, preamble, O.J.
L 48/26, at 27.
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concerning the right of establishment, and the guarantees referred to in Article 5 4 (3)(g) probably need coordination in order to inspire confidence in an economic agent dealing with a
company established in its Member State but registered in another Member State. Article 54 is probably not intended to
offer guarantees to investors on the securities market as such.
Article 54 applies only to companies registered in Member
States as these entities alone enjoy the right of establishment
under the Treaty. Therefore, where the recitals of those certain directives state that each instrument "go[es] beyond the
scope of Article 54(3)(g)," what is meant, though perhaps unintentionally, may well be that these directives are ultra vires
insofar as they claim to coordinate the safeguards which are
required of companies or firms for the protection of the interests of members and others. And the recourse to Article 100
to cover entities not contemplated by Article 5841 seems rather
to show that the real aim pursued by these directives is not to
coordinate guarantees according to Article 54-in the framework of the right of establishment-but to regulate the financial market in which all traded securities and all issuers are to
be dealt with, whether or not the undertakings concerned enjoy the right of establishment under the Treaty or not.
If this argument is correct as regards the three directives
in force, it must a fortiori be so in respect of the Directive on
Insider Dealing, where no guarantee is required (or coordinated) from companies, whether or not falling within the Article 58 definition.
If the coordination provided for in these directives aims at
ensuring better conditions of capital supply to companies, it
then pursues the objective of removing obstacles to the free
movement of capital, not of legal persons, as is the aim of Article 54. The three directives should then have been based
solely on Article 100, as they were all enacted before the
Treaty was amended by the Single European Act. This argument may be deemed of little relevance, because Article 100
was in fact used as one of the legal bases of the three directives, even if for the wrong reasons, and because Article 100a
replaced Article 54 as the legal basis of the Directive on Insider
Dealing. Still, it may be relevant to future legislation concern41. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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ing the securities market in so far as it applies to guarantees
such as disclosures required from companies.
It may also be claimed that, whatever the legal basis of securities related legislation before the Single European Act entered into force, it is now clear that the new Article 100a provides the appropriate legal basis. As a matter of fact, Articles
54, 100, and 100a coexist in the Treaty, as amended by the
Single European Act, so that one cannot assume that the last
has entirely replaced the previous two. It will therefore be necessary in the future to distinguish with some rigor the differing
scope of application of the three provisions.
Article 54(3)(g) will still be applied whenever coordination
of guarantees from companies is deemed necessary in order to
facilitate their intra-Community movement through the setting
up of branches or agencies. On the other hand, a measure
based on Article 100a is deemed to aim at establishing or ensuring the correct functioning of the internal market through
harmonization of national rules, rather than at removing obstacles to the establishment and the proper functioning of the
common market, as is the case of measures based on Article
100. It results from this that Articles 54 and 100a have different areas of application, and Article 100 applies only where the
other two do not. Consequently, future Community legislation
amending the three directives currently in force concerning
the securities market or requiring disclosures from companies
the securities of which are listed on stock exchanges, will probably be based on Article 54 or Article 100a, in order either to
favor the right of establishment or to regulate the capital market, depending on the aim pursued.
It can be seen that by introducing the new Article 100a
into the Treaty, the Single European Act has not only modified
the decision-making procedures, but has also widened the
scope of Community power in regulating the Common Market-in particular, the capital market. In effect, Article 100
empowers the Community only to approximate national provisions that directly affect the establishment or functioning of
the Common Market, while the measures that can be adopted
under Article 100a are qualified as having as their object the establishment and functioning of the Community market itself.
It may be questioned whether the change in the legal basis
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of the Directive on Insider Dealing, from Article 54 to Article
100a, only reflects the change in the Treaty introduced by the
Single European Act or whether it implies a change of conception, such as a change in policy outlook.
In this particular case, the change of the legal basis has not
entailed any change in the procedure for the adoption of the
Directive on Insider Dealing, at least as regards the powers of
Parliament. In effect, both Articles 54 and 100a provide for
the cooperation procedure.4" One may be tempted to assume
that the Court would not find any reason to consider such a
change, even if it proved wrong, as affecting the validity of the
act. In effect, in Commission v. Council ("Containers"),4 3 the Court
stated:
The first consideration is that, since the entry into force
of the Single European Act the procedural requirements of
Article 28 are identical to those of Article 113, whereas Article 235 involves different rules for arriving at the will of the
Council. Consequently, the divergence between the parties
over the choice of Article 28 or Article 113 as the legal basis
of the regulation which is being challenged, has in this case
a purely formal significance, for it can have no legal consequence....
It results from the above that, without its being necessary to rule on the line of demarcation between the respective scope of application of Articles 28 and 113, the Council
acted incorrectly in basing its enactment of the disputed
regulation on Article 235." 4
Even so, such a change of legal basis is likely to affect the
interpretation of the Directive on Insider Dealing when it is
applied by Community institutions. This may be so, for example, when the application is by the Commission in monitoring
the implementation of the Directive, or by the Court in scrutinizing claimed violations of the Directive, or by Member
States' organs in adapting national legislation to Community
law or in interpreting at the judicial level such national legislation.
On the other hand, the change of legal basis has not been
42. See supra notes 7, 30, 33.
43. Commission v. Council, Case 275/87, 1989 E.C.R.
1989).
44. Id. at _ (trans. by author).

__

(judgment of Feb. 2,
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accompanied by any consequential change in the wording of
the Directive on Insider Dealing. This is not, however, sufficient evidence that no change in policy has occurred. The
same provisions may very well serve different purposes and so
may acquire different scope and meaning. This remains true
even if, as is the case here, the preamble itself has been left
unaltered.
Based as it is on Article 100a, the Directive on Insider
Dealing should be seen, not just as a sequel to the three previous directives concerning the securities markets and thus as
another new piece of the Community legislation implementing
Article 5 4 ( 3 )(g), but rather as the first explicit step taken towards regulating the single financial market of the Community.
The implementation of the Directive on Insider Dealing will,
therefore, have to be assessed against the criterion of Member
States' responsibility for correct compliance with Community
law and for the proper functioning of the financial market,
rather than against the criterion of loyal and fair behavior of
companies toward investors. This may have some real impact
on the attitude of the Commission and the Court in exercising
their powers under Articles 169, 173, and 177 of the EEC
45
Treaty.
III. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DIRECTIVE
The nature of a directive is that it binds the Member States
to which it is addressed only as to the goal that it sets up, leaving the Member States free to choose the appropriate legal
46
means in order to satisfy their obligation to attain that goal.
It is, therefore, important to assess the preciseness of the provisions contained in the Directive on Insider Dealing in order
to appraise the margin of discretion left to the Member States
in implementing that Directive.
From this point of view, the definitions of "insider" and of
"inside information" provided for in the Directive on Insider
Dealing appear precise enough, so that in practice hardly any
45. See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, arts. 169, 173, 177, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1,
at 56-58, 298 U.N.T.S. at 75-77.
46. See id. art. 189, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 60, 298 U.N.T.S. at 78-79. "A
directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to
which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form
and methods." Id. at 60, 298 U.N.T.S. at 79.
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margin of discretion is left to Member States as far as those
notions are concerned. According to article 1 of the Directive,
"inside information" shall mean
information which has not been made public of a precise
nature relating to one or several issuers of transferable securities or to one or several transferable securities, which, if
it were made public, would be likely to have a significant
effect on the4 7price of the transferable security or securities
in question.
Article 1 then goes on to define rather meticulously the notion
of "transferable securities" in a way that apparently leaves
nothing open to discretion.48
The notion of a primary insider results from article 2,
which deals with prohibitions to be imposed on such an actor.
An "insider" is any person who holds inside information obtained by one of several means: membership in the administration, management, or supervisory bodies of the issuer; holdings in the capital of the issuer; or access to such information
through the exercise of one's employment, profession, or duties .

The notion of secondary insider results from article 4,
which extends the prohibitions imposed on the primary insider
by article 2 to the secondary insider. It covers "any person
other than those referred to in that article [2] who with full
knowledge of the facts possesses inside information, the direct
or indirect source of which could not be other than a [primary
insider] .5

Not only are these definitions precise enough to warrant
uniform implementation in all Member States, but they are so
comprehensive that it is difficult to imagine what could be left,
as far as the definition of insider trading is concerned, to Member States' discretion, especially given the language of article
6, which states that "[e]ach Member State may adopt provisions more stringent than those laid down by this Directive or
additional provisions, provided that such provisions are ap47. Directive on Insider Dealing, supra note 5, art. 1(1), O.J. L 334/3 1, reprinted
infra p. 180.
48. Id. art. 1(2), reprinted infra p. 180.
49. Id. art. 2(1), reprinted infra p. 180.
50. Id. art. 4, reprinted infra p. 181.
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plied generally."'" It is hardly conceivable that a Member
State could enlarge the notion of insider trading by adding to
the definitions of insider or inside information. Even if one
were to accept theoretically such a possibility, it seems utterly
improbable that a Member State would be willing to extend
these definitions because it would probably be inequitable, and
certainly self-penalizing, to do so just at a moment when the
national securities market is to become a part of a single Community market. One is therefore led to believe that the
formula of article 6 refers to the scope of the prohibition of
insider trading and to the penalties attached to the violation of
such prohibitions, rather than to the definition of insider trading as set forth in the Directive.
This is confirmed by the text of the Directive itself. Article
2(2) provides that where the insider is a company or other type
of legal person, the prohibition of insider trading applies to
the natural persons who take part in the decision to carry out
the transaction.52 Member States are not, however, prevented
from extending the prohibition to the legal person itself
through the use of article 6.
Article 2(3), like article 2(2), limits the application of the
Directive. Article 2(3) prohibits only insider trading transactions effected through a professional intermediary and allows
Member States to exclude transactions effected without the involvement of a professional intermediary outside an organized
market. Member States are thus left with the option to extend
the prohibition to the latter transactions. 3 The same is true of
article 2(4), exempting from the scope of the Directive transactions carried out directly or indirectly by a sovereign state in
pursuit of monetary exchange rate or public debt-management
policies.5 4 Article 2(4) also gives discretion to a Member State
to extend the exception to transactions carried out by its federated states or other similar local authorities in respect of the
management of their public debt by use of article 6 powers.
In turn, article 5 determines the minimum territorial
scope of application of the prohibition of insider trading, 55 by
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.

6, reprinted infra p. 182.
2(2), reprinted infra pp. 180-81.
2(3), reprinted infra p. 181.
2(4), reprinted infra p. 181.
5, reprinted infra pp. 181-82.
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prohibiting such transactions carried out on an organized market situated or operating within a national territory, leaving to
Member States the option of extending the prohibition to
other markets.
Finally, and most important, because article 4 prohibits
secondary insiders from insider trading but not from irregular
disclosure of inside information or from tipping, article 6 explicitly provides that each Member State may prohibit such activity by adopting more stringent provisions.5 6
Member States are bound under Community law to prohibit insider dealing within the limits so determined. Insider
dealing is currently (prior to the implementation of the Directive on Insider Dealing) deemed to be a criminal offense in the
United Kingdom,5 7 Denmark,5 8 and France.5 9 It is a simple
breach of a professional code of conduct in the Federal Republic of Germany ("West Germany"), 60 and it is not specifically
dealt with in the other Member States. It may be anticipated
that, in the three first-mentioned Member States, the current
prohibition is in conformity with the Directive and need not
therefore be altered to ensure compliance with it for this purpose, although definitions may have to be adapted. It appears
equally obvious that such is not the case with West Germany.
The Court does not accept defacto compliance with Community law as legally sufficient, but insists on explicit conformity of national legislation with Community law. 6 Member
States, other than France, Denmark, and the United Kingdom,
must determine what needs to be done in order to comply with
the Directive's obligation to prohibit insider dealing.
From a general and abstract point of view, in order to pro56. Id. art. 6, reprinted infra p. 182.
57. Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, ch. 8 (imposing criminal
sanctions), amended by Financial Services Act 1986, ch. 60 (imposing civil sanctions).
58. Stock Exchange Laws, Article 39 (1986).
59. Law No. 83-1,Jan. 3, 1983, 1983J.O. 162, 1983 D.S.L. 89 replacing Art. 101 of Law No. 70-1208, Dec. 23, 1970, 1970 J.O. 11,981, 1971 D.S.L. 17, replacing
Art. 162-1 and adding Art. 10-1 to Ordinance No. 67-833, Sept. 28, 1967, 1967J.O.
9589, 1967 D.S.L. 42, adding Art. 162-1 to Law No. 66-537, July 24, 1966, 1966J.O.
6402, 1966 D.S.L. 265.
60. See Neufassung der Insider Regeln, in AKTIEN GESELLSCHAFr 1988, at 293.
61. See Commission v. Italy, Case 22/87, 1989 E.C.R. __ (judgment of Feb. 2,
1989); Commission v. Germany, Case 29/84, 1985 E.C.R. 1667, 1673, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH)
14,203, at 16,241-16,242.
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hibit insider dealing, national legislation may make it a criminal offense, an administrative offense, or a tort. A Member
State could not simply leave it to professions (note that not
only intermediaries but also and primarily other persons are
covered by the definitions) to qualify insider dealing as professional misbehavior or a breach of a code of conduct freely accepted by economic agents on the market. This is so because
the obligation to prohibit insider dealing is put, by the Directive on Insider Dealing, on Member States, not on private parties or on corporate bodies lacking compelling public authority. A Member State could not make it a civil tort giving rise
simply to compensation since a civil tort is not "prohibited" as
such, and compensation is not a "penalty" as contemplated in
62
article 13 of the Directive.
This brings one to the observation that the decision
whether to make insider dealing a criminal offense, an administrative offense, or a tort is directly linked to the next question,
which is the margin of discretion left to Member States in
choosing the appropriate sanction. In effect, the different
types of prohibitions envisaged are characterized in part by the
type of sanction to be applied.
On this point, article 13 states that "[e]ach Member State
shall determine penalties to be applied for infringement of the
measures taken pursuant to this Directive. The penalties shall
'6 3
be sufficient to promote compliance with those measures.
Such a loosely drafted provision leaves open to Member States
a wide range of options as to the choice of penalties and, consequently, as to the very nature of the prohibition of insider
trading. One can reasonably and safely assume that the margin of discretion for Member States in implementing the Directive extends to several areas. First, discretion applies to the
qualification of the legal nature of the prohibition, whether penal, administrative, or civil. Second, Member States have discretion in determining the competent authority to review an
infringement and the applicable procedure for such review. Finally, there is discretion in choosing the penalty or penalties to
62. See Directive on Insider Dealing, supra note 5, art. 13, O.J. L 334/32, reprinted
infra p. 184; Amended Proposal, supra note 5, Eur. Par. Sess. Docs., ser. C, Doc. C30018/89; Commission Communication, at 6.
63. Directive on Insider Dealing, supra note 5, art. 13, O.J. L 334/32, reprinted
infra p. 184.
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be applied. In such circumstances, one can expect that insider
trading as a forbidden activity will come under the same definition in all Member States, but will be dealt with differently
under national law as far as its legal qualification and the applicable penalties are concerned.
Only the future can supply a reliable answer to the question of whether these possible differences in national legislation are capable of distorting the workings of securities markets to such an extent as to jeopardize the integrated securities
market of the Community. If this were to be the case, then
new Community legislation would have to be adopted in order
more strictly to coordinate national provisions. Meanwhile,
one must bear in mind that under Community law, the judgment implied in article 13 as to the severity of the penalties,
which "shall be sufficient to promote compliance ' 64 with the
national measures taken pursuant to the Directive on Insider
Dealing, belongs of course to each individual Member State in
the first instance, but is subject to scrutiny by the Commission,
and eventually by the Court, as to its conformity with that Directive. This seems seriously to narrow the margin of discretion left to Member States and the consequent risk of discrepancies between national laws.
IV. MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION
In order to combat insider dealing, it is essential for national authorities to cooperate in exchanging certain information. At the international level, such a need is usually satisfied
by bilateral agreements. At the European level, a convention
has been worked out
by the Council of Europe and is currently
open for signature. 65 At the Community level, cooperation between competent authorities is provided for
in articles 8, 9,
66
and 10 of the Directive on Insider Dealing.

Such a need for tight cooperation and mutual assistance in
exchange of information comes from the very fact that securi64. Id.
65. Convention on Insider Trading, openedfor signature April 20, 1989, Eur. T.S.
No. 130 [hereinafter Convention].
66. See Directive on Insider Dealing, supra note 5, arts. 8-10, O.J. L 334/32, reprinted infra pp. 182-83.
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ties markets are increasingly open to foreign investors and that
their identity is usually not disclosed by stock brokers when
selling or buying on behalf of their clients. This is stated in the
preamble to the Council of Europe Convention (the "Convention") in the following manner: "Considering that, because of
the internationalisation of markets and the ease of present-day
communications, operations of this nature [i.e., insider trading]
are carried out sometimes on the market of a State by persons
not resident in that State or acting through persons not resident there ... 67
It seems reasonable to expect cooperation to be more effective under the Directive on Insider Dealing than under the
Convention for two reasons. The first is that the Directive not
only defines insider trading in a more precise and more comprehensive way than the Convention, but it also enjoins Member States to prohibit and to sanction insider trading,6" while
the Convention confines itself to providing for mutual assistance between Contracting Parties, whatever attitude they may
take in respect of insider trading.6 9 It is to be expected that a
greater uniformity of attitudes toward insider trading will entail greater efficiency in exchanging information about it.
The second reason for expecting tighter cooperation and
greater efficacy under the Directive is that according to article
8(1) thereof, "each Member State shall designate the administrative authority or authorities competent, if necessary in collaboration with other authorities to ensure that the provisions
adopted pursuant to this Directive are applied, ' 70 and according to subdivision (2) of the same article, "the competent authorities must be given all supervisory and investigatory powers that are necessary for the exercise of their functions, where
appropriate in collaboration with other authorities." ' 7 1 Under
these provisions, there must always be in each Member State
one or more authorities responsible for cooperation, which is,
or are, to be administrative, rather than judicial, in nature.
This will make exchange of information less formal and will,
67.
68.
69.
70.

Convention, supra note 65, preamble, Eur. T.S. No. 130, at 2.
See supra notes 47-63 and accompanying text.
Convention, supra note 65, arts. 2-10, Eur. T.S. No. 130, at 3-5.
Directive on Insider Dealing, supra note 5, art. 8(1), O.J. L 334/32, reprinted

infra p. 182.
71. Id. art. 8(2), reprinted infra p. 182.

1989-1990]

INSIDER DEALING DIRECTIVE;

hopefully, entail the setting up of a reasonably homogenous
network of national authorities endowed with the necessary
powers to carry out their duties. Insofar as current national
law does not provide for such a competent authority or for
such powers, it must be modified to that end.
For its part, the Convention only provides for such cooperation as is possible under existing national laws and puts no
obligation on the Contracting Parties to amend their legislation in order to supply their competent authorities, which in
this case may be administrative as well as judicial, with all supervisory and investigatory powers necessary for the exercise
of their duties. 2
Moreover, the Convention and the Directive on Insider
Dealing are conceived as a first step towards an increasingly
effective system for combating insider trading, and both provide for mecfi'anisms to prepare the next steps. But while the
Convention provides only for a meeting of experts charged
with the tasks of making suggestions,7 3 the Directive on Insider
Dealing simply extends the competences and activity of the existing "Contact Committee" set up by article 20 of the Directive on Admission to Securities Listing to the new area of insider trading.74 Accordingly, the Contact Committee shall
72. Convention, supra note 65, art. 6(l)-(3), Eur. T.S. No. 130, at 3-4.
73. Id. art. 18, at 6.
74. Directive on Insider Dealing, supra note 5, art. 12, O.J. L 334/32, reprinted
infra p. 184. Article 20 of the Directive on Admission to Securities Listing states:
1. A Contact Committee (hereinafter called "the Committee") shall be set
up alongside the Commission. Its function shall be:
(a) without prejudice to Articles 169 and 170 of the EEC Treaty to facilitate the harmonized implementation of this Directive through regular consultations on any practical problems arising from its application and on which exchanges of view are deemed useful;
(b) to facilitate the establishment of a concerted attitude between the
Member States on the more stringent or additional conditions and
obligations which, pursuant to Article 5 of this Directive, they may
lay down at [the] national level;
(c) to advise the Commision, if necessary, on any supplements or
amendments to be made to this Directive or on any adjustments to
be made in accordance with Article 21.
2. It shall not be the function of the Committee to appraise the merits of
the decisions taken by the competent authorities in individual cases.
3. The Committee shall be composed of persons appointed by the Member States and of representatives of the Commission. The chairman
shall be a representative of the Commission. Secretarial services shall
be provided by the Commission.
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have two additional functions. First, it will allow for regular
consultation on any practical problems that arise from the application of the Directive on Insider Dealing when exchanges
of view are deemed useful.7 5 Second, the Contact Committee
will, when necessary, advise the Commission on changes to be
made to that Directive. 6 The very fact that these tasks are
conferred on a standing committee accustomed to working together warrants the hope of greater efficiency.
The rules of professional secrecy which are to govern the
exchange of information and the definition of circumstances
where assistance may be refused are substantially the same
77
under the Convention and the Directive on Insider Dealing.
V. THE EXTERNAL COMPETENCE OF THE COMMUNITY
Article 11 of the Directive on Insider Dealing states that
"[t]he Community may, in conformity with the Treaty, conclude agreements with non-member countries on the matters
governed by this Directive. ' 78 At first sight this might appear
as a simple, straightforward statement. In fact, it becomes a
very puzzling provision when considering what it is meant to
achieve and its actual legal effect.
Notably, the provision is drafted with the verb "may."
The provision could be intended to confer competence on the
Community in the field of foreign relations, enabling it to conclude agreements on insider trading. The Council, in a directive adopted pursuant to Article 100a,79 may be saying not only
that such are the Community rules on insider trading, but also
that these rules may be altered through international agreements to be concluded by the Community. This cannot be the
4.

Meetings of the Committtee shall be convened by its chairman, either
on his own initiative or at the request of one Member State delegation.
The Committee shall draw up its rules of procedure.
Directive on Admission to Securities Listing, supra note 25, art. 20, O.J. L 66/21, at
24-25.
75. Directive on Insider Dealing, supra note 5, art. 12, Oj. L 334/32, reprinted
infra p. 184.
76. Id.
77. Compare id.art. 9, O.J. L 334/32, reprinted infra pp. 182-83 with Convention,
supra note 65, art. 6(4)-(5) Eur. T.S. No. 130, at 4.
78. Directive on Insider Dealing, supra note 5, art. 11, O.J. L 334/32, reprinted
infra pp. 183-84.
79. See supra notes 30-45 and accompanying text.
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case under Community law, however, as interpreted by the
Court of Justice.
According to the Court, no Community institution, be it
the Council or any other, acting alone or in accordance with
whatever procedure involving several institutions, has the
power to confer competence on the Community as a subject of
international law.8 ° It is true that, according to the Court, the
external competence of the Community may result, "not only
from an express conferment by the Treaty ...but may equally
flow from other provisions of the Treaty and from measures
adopted, within the framework of those provisions, by the
Community institutions,' '1 but, such competence derives from
the system of the Treaty itself, which attaches consequences to
the adoption of common rules or to the possibility of adopting
them.
In Commission v. Council ("AETR "), the Court said:
In particular, each time the Community, with a view to
implementing a common policy envisaged by the Treaty,
adopts provisions laying down common rules, whatever
form these may take, the Member States no longer have the
right, acting individually or even collectively, to undertake
obligations with third countries which affect those rules.
As and when such common rules come into being, the
Community alone is in a position to assume and to carry out
contractual obligations towards third countries affecting the
whole sphere of application of the Community legal system. 82
This is a definition of an "exclusive competence," a competence that Member States no longer possess and only the Community can exercise.
In Opinion Given Pursuantto Article 228(1) of the EEC Treaty
("Laying-up Fund Opinion"), the Court stated:
[W]henever Community law has created for the institutions
of the Community powers within its internal system for the
purpose of attaining a specific objective, the Community
has authority to enter into the international commitments
80. See Commission v. Council ("AETR"), Case 22/70, 1971 E.C.R. 263, Com-

mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH)

8134.

81. Id. at 274, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)

82. Id.

8134, at 7525.
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necessary for the attainment of that objective even in the
absence of an express provision in that connexion.
This is particularly so in all cases in which internal
power has already been used in order to adopt measures
which come within the attainment of common policies. It is,
however, not limited to that eventuality. Although the internal Community measures are only adopted when the international agreement is concluded and made enforceable,
as is envisaged in the present case by the proposal for a regulation to be submitted to the Council by the Commission,
the power to bind the Community vis-d-vis third countries
nevertheless flows by implication from the provisions of the
Treaty creating the internal power and in so far as the participation of the Community in the international agreement
is, as here, necessary for the attainment of one of the objectives of the Community.8 3
This is a "potential" (or "virtual") competence that the Community possesses, but not to the exclusion of the corresponding competence of Member States (concurrent competence).
As soon as the Community makes use of its competence, by
issuing common rules either autonomously or conventionally,
such competence becomes exclusive. In the meantime, Member States can assume international commitments, just as they
can legislate domestically in conformity with existing Community law, provided they do not, in so doing, establish obstacles
to the future exercise of Community competence.
Insofar as the Directive on Insider Dealing contains common rules, it results from the Treaty that the Community enjoys an exclusive competence to conclude agreements affecting
those rules. In related areas, both the Community and the
Member States are entitled to conclude international agreements, the former under Article 100a in particular, the latter as
long as there are no common rules likely to be affected, and
provided they do not interfere, in so doing, with future developments of Community law. In these circumstances, article 11
of the Directive on Insider Dealing cannot possibly be considered as originally conferring 'competence on the Community in
the field of international relations.
It may be noted though that article 11 refers not to com83. Opinion Given Pursuant to Article 228(1) of the EEC Treaty ("Laying-up
Fund Opinion"), 1977 E.C.R. 741, 755, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8405, at 7301.
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mon rules contained in the Directive, but to "matters governed
by this Directive." 8 4 It could be questioned whether article 11
may be interpreted as assuming Community competence beyond the limits resulting from the normal play of common
rules, so operating, to that extent, a change in the nature of
such competence from potential to exclusive. Such an interpretation, that would imply, for instance, that Member States
did not have the authority to conclude the Council of Europe
Convention, is not warranted by the wording of article 11 and
could hardly be presumed to represent the will of the Council.
Treaty-making powers of the Community are governed by
Article 228 of the Treaty, according to which international
agreements are negotiated by the Commission and concluded
by the Council. 8 ' However, that Article says nothing about the
procedure to be followed in negotiating and concluding agreements. It is generally accepted that the negotiating procedure
laid down by Article 113(3) of the Treaty in the case of commercial agreements, under which the Council authorizes the
Commission to open negotiations and lays down directives for
conducting them, applies by analogy to all agreements.8 6 Following a successful negotiation the decision to conclude an
agreement is taken by the Council according to the requirements of the Treaty provision under which it is empowered to
act in the area to which the agreement relates.
From this point of view article 11 might be considered as
authorizing the Commission t( negotiate multilateral or bilateral agreements with non-Member Countries on insider trading. If this were the correct interpretation of the article, several consequences would stem from it.
First, "the Community .. . may conclude""7 would mean
"the Commission is hereby authorized to negotiate," which is
a rather surprising way of drafting by any standard. Second,
84. Directive on Insider Dealing, supra note 5, art. 11, Oj. L 334/32, reprinted
infra pp. 183-84.
85. EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 228, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 71-72, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, 90.
86. Id. art. 113, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 42-43, 298 U.N.T.S. at 60. "Where
agreements with third countries need to be negotiated, the Commission shall make
recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise the Commission to open the
necessary negotiations." Id. at 43, 298 U.N.T.S. at 60.
87. Directive on Insider Dealing, supra note 5, art. 11, Oj. L 334/32, reprinted
infra pp. 183-84.
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the Commission would be enabled to negotiate with no further
action by the Council, which would be contrary to all past practice. Third, such an interpretation would also mean that the
authorization to negotiate would have been adopted under the
full procedure laid down by Article 100a. According to current
practice, however, the full decision-making procedure is applicable only to the conclusion of agreements, whereas authorization to negotiate is considered a "preparatory act" to which it
is necessary to apply only the prescribed Council voting rule.
Finally, the phrase "inconformity with the Treaty" '8 would appear meaningless if article 11 is viewed as authorizing the
Commission to negotiate. If this phrase means that recourse
to appropriate procedures under the Treaty is thereby reserved, then it must necessarily refer to the whole process of
treaty-making and more specifically to the conclusion and not
only to the negotiation of international agreements. It follows
that article 11 can hardly be taken as providing an authorization to negotiate.
The most plausible interpretation of article 11 appears to
be one according to which this provision has no particular
legal meaning or legal effect, but merely formulates a policy
program. It would then mean that "the Community is prepared to conclude appropriate agreements on insider trading
with willing third countries." Such a statement, appropriately
based on Article 100a, has no bearing on Community competence to conclude such agreements (such a competence flows
from the Treaty as interpreted by the Court), nor has it a bearing on the procedures applicable to future negotiation and the
conclusion of such agreements, which are to be concluded "in
conformity with the Treaty," as explicitly stated.8 9
For all these reasons, one may conclude that, in order to
be interpreted consistently with Community law, article 11
must be denied any legal content.
Under the Treaty, as interpreted by the Court, the Community can, using its exclusive or potential competence, as the
case may be, commit itself vis-A-vis third countries either to impose new obligations on Member States or to regulate directly,
88. Id.
89. Id.
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in an agreed manner, insider dealing in the unified financial
market to which the Single European Act looks toward.
It seems obvious that the Community could assume international commitments under the powers conferred upon it by
Article 100a.9° Could financial services also become the subject matter of trade agreements within the meaning of Article
113, which provides for a simple procedure, not involving the
Parliament, for their conclusion?9 One may question whether
the sentence "in conformity with the Treaty"92 in article 11
may be shadowing such an orientation. The recent trend in
GATT negotiations, where both the Community and the
United States are favoring the inclusion of the exchange of
services as part of the definition of international trade and the
theoretical possibility of construing stock exchanges as suppliers of financial services could warrant such a solution.
There are signs in positions taken in the past by the Commission that financial services may be included in trade agreements made pursuant to Article 113. In proposing to open negotiations in respect of the United Nations convention on a
Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, the Commission has
already shown a preference for an extensive interpretation of
Article 113 that covers not only the goods transported (which
were not at issue), but also the services of transporting them.93
In the original proposal to conclude an agreement with
Switzerland on the establishment of insurance companies,
based on Article 113 of the Treaty, the Commission went even
further in its interpretation of Article 113 as covering not only
actual trade in insurance services, but also the establishment of
suppliers of such services.94
Finally, the lack of a judicial definition of the notion of
90. See supra notes 30-45 and accompanying text.
91. See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 113, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1,at 42-3, 298
U.N.T.S. at 60.
92. Directive on Insider Dealing, supra note 5, art. 11, O.J. L 334/32, reprinted
infra pp. 183-84.

93. The proposed negotiation was to be based on Articles 113 and 116 of the
EEC Treaty. EEC Treaty, supra note 3, arts. 113, 116, 1973 Gr.Brit. T.S. No. 1, at
42, 43, 298 U.N.T.S. at 60, 61; see 6 BULL. OF EuR. COMM., No. 2292, at 56 (1975);
AGENCE EUROPE, No. 1773 (New Series) at 5, June 21, 1975 (French Edition).
94. See Proposal for a Council Decision, preamble, O.J. C 154/33 (1983).
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commercial policy allows for this expansive interpretation.9 5
Such a development, if it were to take place, would probably be a major step in the direction of extending the scope of
Article 113 so as to make it eventually coincide substantially
with that of foreign relations of the Community. This development would certainly constitute a major distortion in the interpretation of the system of the Treaty as based on the notion of
competences of attribution.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, more questions have been raised than
clearly answered-questions about the legal basis of the Directive on Insider Dealing, about the scope of the discretion left
to Member States, and about the Directive's effects on the external relations of the Community. Those questions relate to
the balance of power between the Community and its Member
States, on the one hand, and between the various Community
institutions-the Commission, Parliament, and Council-on
the other.
Uncertainty as to the correct legal solution to these questions is a clear sign of the Community's youth. The Community is a recently formed political structure, and tension between its institutions is inevitable. Consequently, extra-legal
criteria are sometimes applied to the choice of legal basis of an
act, and this in turn determines the procedure applicable to the
act's adoption. Moreover, having recently been modified by
the Single European Act, the Community system is likely to
undergo further reform in the near future, thus contributing to
the evolutive character of the practices followed by Community institutions.
Finally, the case law of the Court remains limited in the
number of decisions relating to the powers of the institutions,
the current choice of the legal basis of Community legislation,
the scope and the effects of Community acts, and the jurisdiction of the Communities in external relations.
Far from pretending to dispose of these questions, this Article represents a modest sampling of them in the particular
case of the Directive on Insider Dealing, which, as we have
95. See Commission v. Council, Case 275/87, 1989 E.C.R. _ (judgment of Feb.
2, 1989).
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seen, represents a first step towards regulating the single financial market of the Community.
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APPENDIX A
Council Directive
of 13 November 1989
coordinating regulations on insider dealing
(89/592/EEC)
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in particular Article 100a thereof,
Having regard to the proposal for the Commission,(1
2)
In cooperation with the European Parliament,(
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social
3)
Committee,(
Whereas Article 100a (1) of the Treaty states that the Council
shall adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in
Member States which have as their object the establishment
and functioning of the internal market;
Whereas the secondary market in transferable securities plays
an important role in the financing of economic agents;
Whereas, for that market to be able to play its role effectively,
every measure should be taken to ensure that market operates
smoothly;
Whereas the smooth operation of that market depends to a
large extent on the confidence it inspires in investors;
Whereas the factors on which such confidence depends include
the assurance afforded to investors that they are placed on an
equal footing and that they will be protected against the improper use of inside information;
Whereas, by benefiting certain investors as compared with
others, insider dealing is likely to undermine that confidence
and may therefore prejudice the smooth operation of the market;
(1) OJ No C 153, 11.6. 1987, p.8 and OJ No C 277, 27. 10. 1988, p. 13 .
(2) OJ No C 187, 18. 7. 1987, p.93 and Decision of 11 October 1989 (not yet
published in the Official Journal).
(3) OJ No C 35, 8. 2. 1989, p. 2 2 .
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Whereas the necessary measures should therefore be taken to
combat insider dealing;
Whereas in some Member States there are no rules or regulations prohibiting insider dealing and whereas the rules or regulations that do exist differ considerably from one Member
State to another;
Whereas it is therefore advisable to adopt coordinated rules at
a Community level in this field;
Whereas such coordinated rules also have the advantage of
making it possible, through cooperation by the competent authorities, to combat transfrontier insider dealing more effectively;
Whereas, since the acquisition or disposal of transferable securities necessarily involves a prior decision to acquire or to
dispose taken by the person-who undertakes one or other of
these operations, the carrying-out of this acquisition-or disposal does not constitute in itself the use of inside information;
Whereas insider dealing involves taking advantage of inside information; whereas the mere fact that market-makers, bodies
authorized to act as contrepartie,or stockbrokers with inside information confine themselves, in the first two cases, to pursuing their normal business of buying or selling securities or, in
the last, to carrying out an order should not in itself be
deemed to constitute use of such inside information; whereas
likewise the fact of carrying out transactions with the aim of
stabilizing the price of new issues or secondary offers of transferable securities should not in itself be deemed to constitute
use of inside information;
Whereas estimates developed from publicly available data cannot be regarded as inside information and whereas, therefore,
any transaction carried out on the basis of such estimates does
not constitute insider dealing within the meaning of this Directive;
Whereas communication of inside information to an authority,
in order to enable it to ensure that the provisions of this Directive or other provisions in force are respected, obviously cannot be covered by the prohibitions laid down by this Directive,
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HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
Article 1
For the purposes of this Directive:
1. 'inside information' shall mean information which has not
been made public of a precise nature relating to one or several
issuers of transferable securities or to one or several transferable securities, which, if it were made public, would be likely to
have a significant effect on the price of the transferable security
or securities in question;
2.

'transferable securities' shall mean:
(a) shares and debt securities, as well as securities
equivalent to shares and debt securities;
(b) contracts or rights to subscribe for, acquire or dispose
of securities referred to in (a);
(c) futures contracts, options and financial futures in respect of securities referred to in (a);
(d) index contracts in respect of securities referred to in

(a),
when admitted to trading on a market which is regulated and
supervised by authorities recognized by public bodies, operates regularly and is accessible directly or indirectly to the public.
Article 2
1.

Each Member State shall prohibit any person who:
by virtue of his membership of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of the issuer,
by virtue of his holding in the capital of the issuer, or
because he has access to such information by virtue of
the exercise of his employment, profession or duties,
possesses inside information from taking advantage of that information with full knowledge of the facts by acquiring or disposing of for his own account or for the account of a third
party, either directly or indirectly, transferable securities of
the issuer or issuers to which that information relates.

-

2. Where the person referred to in paragraph 1 is a company
or other type of legal person, the prohibition laid down in that
paragraph shall apply to the natural persons who take part in
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the decision to carry out the transaction for the account of the
legal person concerned.
3. The prohibition laid down in paragraph 1 shall apply to
any acquisition or disposal of transferable securities effected
through a professional intermediary.
Each Member State may provide that this prohibition shall not
apply to acquisitions or disposals of transferable securities effected without the involvement of a professional intermediary
outside a market as defined in Article 1(2) infine.
4. This Directive shall not apply to transactions carried out in
pursuit of monetary, exchange-rate or public debt-management policies by a sovereign State, by its central bank or any
other body designated to that effect by the State, or by any
person acting on their behalf. Member States may extend this
exemption to their federated States or similar local authorities
in respect of the management of their public debt.
Article 3
Each Member State shall prohibit any person subject to the
prohibition laid down in Article 2 who possesses inside information from:
(a) disclosing that inside information to any third party
unless such disclosure is made in the normal course of the
exercise of his employment, profession or duties;
(b) recommending or procuring a third party, on the basis
of that inside information, to acquire or dispose of transferable securities admitted to trading on its securities markets as referred to in Article 1(2) in fine.
Article 4
Each Member State shall also impose the prohibition provided
for in Article 2 on any person other than those referred to in
that Article who with full knowledge of the facts possesses inside information, the direct or indirect source of which could
not be other than a person referred to in Article 2.
Article 5
Each Member State shall apply the prohibitions provided for in
Articles 2, 3 and 4, at least to actions undertaken within its
territory to the extent that the transferable securities con-
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cerned are admitted to trading on a market of a Member State.
In any event, each Member State shall regard a transaction as
carried out within its territory if it is carried out on a market, as
defined in Article 1(2) infine, situated or operating within that
territory.
Article 6
Each Member State may adopt provisions more stringent than
those laid down by this Directive or additional provisions, provided that such provisions are applied generally. In particular
it may extend the scope of the prohibition laid down in Article
2 and impose on persons referred to in Article 4 the prohibitions laid down in Article 3.
Article 7
The provisions of Schedule C.5 (a) of the Annex to Directive
79/279/EEC( ' ) shall also apply to companies and undertakings
the transferable securities of which, whatever their nature, are
admitted to trading on a market as referred to in Article 1(2) in
fine of this Directive.
Article 8
1. Each Member State shall designate the administrative authority or authorities competent, if necessary in collaboration
with other authorities to ensure that the provisions adopted
pursuant to this Directive are applied. It shall so inform the
Commission which shall transmit that information to all Member States.
2. The competent authorities must be given all supervisory
and investigatory powers that are necessary for the exercise of
their functions, where appropriate in collaboration with other
authorities.
Article 9
Each Member State shall provide that all persons employed or
formerly employed by the competent authorities referredc [sic]
to in Article 8 shall be bound by professional secrecy. Information covered by professional secrecy may not be divulged to
(') OJ No L 66, 16. 3. 1979, p. 2 1 .
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any person or authority except by virtue of provisions laid
down by law.
Article 10

1. The competent authorities in the Member States shall cooperate with each other whenever necessary for the purpose of
carrying out their duties, making use of the powers mentioned
in Article 8(2). To this end, and notwithstanding Article 9,
they shall exchange any information required for that purpose,
including information relating to actions prohibited, under the
options given to Member States by Article 5 and by the second
sentence of Article 6, only by the Member State requesting cooperation. Information thus exchanged shall be covered by
the obligation of professional secrecy to which the persons employed or formerly employed by the competent authorities receiving the information are subject.
2. The competent authorities may refuse to act on a request
for information:
(a) where communication of the information might adversely affect the sovereignty, security or public policy of
the State addressed;
(b) where judicial proceedings have already been initiated
in respect of the same actions and against the same persons before the authorities of the State addressed or
where final judgment has already been passed on such
persons for the same actions by the competent authorities
of the State addressed.
3. Without prejudice to the obligations to which they are subject in judicial proceedings under criminal law, the authorities
which receive information pursuant to paragraph 1 may use it
only for the exercise of their functions within the meaning of
Article 8 (1) and in the context of administrative or judicial
proceedings specifically relating to the exercise of those functions. However, where the competent authority communicating information consents thereto, the authority receiving the
information may use it for other purposes or forward it to
other States' competent authorities.
Article 11

The Community may, in conformity with the Treaty, conclude
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agreements with non-member countries on the matters governed by this Directive.
Article 12

The Contact Committee set up by Article 20 of Directive 79/
279/EEC shall also have as its function:
(a) to permit regular consultation on any practical
problems which arise from the application of this Directive
and on which exchanges of view are deemed useful;
(b) to advise the Commission, if necessary, on any additions or amendments to be made to this Directive.
Article 13

Each Member State shall determine the penalties to be applied
for infringement of the measures taken pursuant to this Directive. The penalties shall be sufficient to promote compliance
with those measures.
Article 14

1. Member States shall take the measures necessary to comply with this Directive before 1 June 1992. They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof.
2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the
provisions of national law which they adopt in the field governed by this Directive.
Article 15

This Directive is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Brussels, 13 November 1989.
For the Council
The President

P. Br~govoy

